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Haskins: Representative Government in Early Massachusetts

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND
THE "BIBLE COMMONWEALTH" IN
EARLY MASSACHUSETTS*
GEORGE

T

L. HASKINST

may seem somewhat paradoxical, or at the
very least to require some definition of terms. If the government of
the colony of Massachusetts Bay in early New England was indeed a "Bible
Commonwealth," or even a theocracy, as it has also been characterized, is
that not inconsistent with its being a "representative government" in any
broad, or even literal sense? Alternatively, even if the government contained
a recognizable representative element, was its voice so small, so insignificant, or
so manipulated that it merely supported an entrenched religiously inspired
oligarchy? The paradox, if there is one, can be resolved to some extent
through an analysis of the degree to which the colony's governmental
structure, as well as its laws, represented the desires, claims and interests of its
small group of founders and leaders, on the one hand, and of the inhabitants
generally, on the other. Such an analysis, tentative though it may prove to
be, can at least suggest avenues for future research leading towards a more
accurate understanding of the evolution of the instruments of government,
and, more particularly, of representative institutions, in the colony.
HE TITLE OF THIS ARTICLE

A priori, it is conceivable that the colony's government in its vital
formative period from 1630 to 1648, was either oligarchic, founded and
framed upon biblical precepts, and supported by a small, God-fearing
segment of the population, or that it was not a "Bible" commonwealth, but a
democratic government with broadly based representative institutions. The
problem, though deliberately oversimplified, was put to this writer not long ago
by the former Solicitor-General of the United States, The Honorable Erwin
N. Griswold, when he inquired thoughtfully: "Why did the early colony of
Massachusetts Bay not become a Bible Commonwealth? Why did it not pursue
the path of Moslem countries which for centuries drew upon religiously
inspired ideals in framing their laws?"
Dean Griswold's question was undoubtedly based on two principal
assumptions: first, that the laws and governmental institutions of early
Massachusetts were not derived primarily from the Bible and interpretations
thereof; second, that the colony's legal system, though partly formed by religious
* Revision and adaptation of an address by George L. Haskins presented at the 50th anniversary
of the Institute of Historical Research, University of London.
t Algernon Sydney Biddle Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Former President,
American Society of Legal History; Fellow, The Royal Historical Society; LL.B., Harvard;
M.A. (Hon.), University of Pennsylvania.
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ideals, ultimately reflected English experience and institutions, as well as the
indigenous growth which resulted from the changed social and other needs of
the colonists. Both those assumptions, it is submitted, are essentially correct,
but they require considerable elaboration, and perhaps the suggestion of an
intermediate position, before answers to the basic question can be suggested.
Hopefully, the time has long since passed when informed historians of
Massachusetts' colonial law and institutions can refer to them as the product
of a theocracy, in which "the Scriptures were an infallible guide for both judge
and legislator."' Unquestionably, the progressive and reforming elements in
the cause of early Puritanism had largely prompted the founding of a colony
in which men could build a purified "Citty vpon a Hill," and enter into a
covenant to live together, obedient to the world of God as revealed in the
Bible However, no priestly caste within the colony had the controlling voice
of authority, and the primary functions of government were in the hands of
secular officers and civil courts.' Church and state were separate, each indeed
striving for ultimately similar goals, each planted and brought up "like two
twinnes,"' but the authoritative voice in the colony's government clearly did
not lie with the ministers of the churches, who were distinctly subordinated to
the civil arm, both in doctrine and authority.' It is true that the clergy were not
infrequently consulted on grave matters of general or special policy,6 but the
ministers were not permitted to hold legislative office, and they took no direct
part in framing or executing any civil laws of the colony." Indeed, the secular
authority and its courts promptly assumed, as part of the colony's "due form
of government," jurisdiction over many matters which in contemporary
England were within the exclusive domain of the ecclesiastical courts.' Thus,
although in principle the partnership of the civil authorities and the clergy
was declared to be an equal one, and although they supplemented one
another's efforts, the secular arm was clearly the dominant one.
Therefore, to define the early colonial government of Massachusetts as
either a theocracy or as a "Bible Commonwealth" is to misconstrue or
misunderstand both its nature and its functions. While it is true that the actual
I C. J.

HILKEY, Legal Development In Colonial Massachusetts 1630-1686, in 37 COLUMBIA
STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAw 68 (1910).
2 G. L. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHOmrY IN EARLY MASSACHUSErrS 24 (1968)
[hereinafter cited

as LAw AND AUTmoRITY].
3 Id.

at 61-62.
Epistle, as found in THE LAwS AND LIBERTIES OF
' LAw AND AUTHORITY supra note 2, at 62.

MASSACHUSETTS

6 1 WINTHROP'S JOURNAL: HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND

1630-1649, 116, 119, 128-29, 130, 143-44

4 See

(J. K. HosMER ed. 1908) [hereinafter cited as

(M.

FARRAND

ed. 1929).

WINTmOP'S JOURNAL].

7 H. E. WARE, COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS PROCEEDINGS 151, 163 (1907).

aId.
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migration and founding of the colony on New England Shores had been
motivated largely by religious purposes,' it must not be forgotten that the
original organization of the colony was the result of the formation of a trading
company which had received its royal charter in 1629 and which, like others
0
of its day, was owned by shareholders, known as "freemen."" The latter, in
the General Court of which they were the constitutent members, elected the
governing officers and the "Assistants," who were similar in many respects to
a present-day board of directors. Contrary to the usual custom, the Company
itself, together with its general institutional structure, did not remain in London
but was transferred to New England when the colony was settled. However,
almost none of the freemen of the Company, except about a dozen who were
the officers and Assistants of the Company, joined the emigration as colonists,
in fact those few men also constituted the General Court, with the result that
the matrix of government was necessarily oligarchical from the start, in that no
other inhabitants of the colony had any legal right to a voice in its affairs."
Even the transmutation of the enterprise from a commercial undertaking
into a body politic, which occurred in 1631, very shortly after settlement,
through the addition of over a hundred new "freemen," who were not
1
shareholders in any commercial sense, " had little effect at first upon the
authoritarian nature of the government, and for the following reason. Six
months earlier, a number of inhabitants had been asked to express their
opinion upon the desirability of giving to the Assistants all the functions of the
General Court. This they had done, affirmatively and informally, by erection
of hands, and the powers of government therefore remained in the hands of
3
the 10 or 11 officers and Assistants only. Although the original tradingcompany institutions persisted, at least in form, and became the framework of
the new colonial government, the de facto "legal" powers of the leaders were
bolstered by current political conceptions, which nurtured the ideal that civic
duty required men to subject themselves to their rulers, and which taught that
rulers, however selected, derived their authority from God.' Hence, the
government could remain essentially authoritarian at its core, even when
the franchise was extended even further, for this Puritan society was viewed
as an organism in which ultimately every part was subordinate to rulers whose
duty was to lead, coerce and discipline." In the early 1630's, therefore, both in
9

LAw AND AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 9-24.
hId.at 26. See also J.Beranger, NATHANIEL WARD

10

Id. at 9-10.

(1969).

12 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY

366 (N. B.

SHURTLEFF

ed. 1853-1854) [hereinafter cited as RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS].
:' Id. at 79.
14 P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 420 (1939).
15See LAw AND AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 43-44; P. MILLER & T. H. JOHNSON, THE PURITANS
182-83by(1938).
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theory and in practice, the small group of governing officers and Assistants--or
magistrates as they were very soon called-were indeed "Gods upon earthe.""
The introduction of representative government for the limited purpose of
taxation was forced upon the magistrates in 1632," and more generally for the
election of deputies from the towns to the General Court in 1634.8 Of at least
equal importance was a vote by the town deputies in 1634 to transfer back to
the General Court all powers and functions previously granted to the Assistants
in 1630."° The General Court thereby became again an elective body, but now
included also about 20 deputies who, in conformity with parliamentary
tradition, were chosen by and received their mandates from the freemen of the
colony's towns.2 Typically, the General Court thereafter met three times a
year as a representative assembly, together with the Governor, the DeputyGovernor and the Assistants at the fourth, or election session. Every freeman
was expected to be present and to "gyve his owne voyce." 2"
This drastic alteration in institutional structure, by the introduction of
representative government amounted to a constitutional revolution. However,
the change had little immediate practical effect on the actual governmental
functioning of the colony. Principally, this was because the 1631 law, which
first extended the franchise to non-shareholders, contained a provision that no
one should be a freeman of the colony unless he was a member of one of the
congregational churches. That law, though a clear violation of the charter,
which permitted no such restriction on the franchise, confined voting to those
who were acknowledged believers in the original Puritan cause, and in the
religious tenets which had inspired the colony's founding. It was therefore no
accident that the original officers and other official leaders continued, with few
exceptions, to be elected year after year to the highest positions of governmental
authority, 3 and that, for the greater part of the first decade, the essentially
authoritarian nature of the colony's government persisted to the extent that it
did. However, as time went on, as the number of freemen increased, and as
the town deputies became more active in enlarging business of the General
Court, that authority was challenged-both from within and without the
political organization-in the course of a series of episodes which threatened
the very existence of the colonial establishment.2' This enlarged participation

is 4 WnTHRop

PAPERS 476 (Mass. Historical Society 1944).

supra note 6, at 79.
IS RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETMrs, supra note 12, at 117.
17 WINTHRoP's JOURNAL
9

1 d. at 118-19.
LAw AND AutromrY, supra note 2, at 31.
21 RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETrS, supra note 12, at 119.
22
ld. at 87.
28 LAw AND AUTHORIT, supra note 2, at 41, 65.
24 Id. at 35-41.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss2/1
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on the part of the deputies, as well as their extensive committee work for
the General Court, is in itself hardly consistent with the conclusion that the
colony was in any sense a theocratic state.
Although attention must be given to the continuing importance of the
religiously inspired nature of the colonial enterprise, for present purposes of at
least equal importance are: (1) the laws which were in effect and the
institutions which were functioning during and towards the end of the first
period in the colony's growth; and, (2) the composition and powers of the
electorate in that period. Even a casual scrutiny of the colony's laws reveals
conclusively that few of them were of Biblical origin.25 Moreover, the franchise
was undoubtedly far more extensive than has been supposed, and the elected
freemen in the colony participated in the functions of government to a far
greater degree than parliamentary representatives in England during the early
seventeenth century.2" Moreover, at the town level, non-freemen not only took
part but many held office in town government. 7 Consideration of the factors
involved in these two major areas should help pave the way for concluding why
the colonists failed to follow the course originally open to them, namely, to
create, or to accommodate themselves to a "Bible" or even theocratic state
in which there could be little room for innovation and development.
Turning first to some of the major characteristics of the Massachusetts
colonial laws in the period under discussion, it may be stated with confidence
that they were patterned and constructed partly after English ways, and partly
upon the colonists' striving towards new horizons. As in architecture and
methods of farming, so in law and in the instruments of government their
varied heritage was transplanted across the western ocean in forms which were
neither rude and untechnical, nor primarily Biblical, nor merely responsive to
frontier conditions. An analysis of their first compendium and revision of
laws, collected 18 years after settlement in the Code of 1648, reveals some
elements of the common law and the statutes, some local customary law of the
manors and boroughs in districts from which they had emigrated, and even
some of the law of the ecclesiastical courts.29 Likewise, present, but chiefly in
the area of capital crimes, were precepts and rules taken almost verbatim
Chiefly, laws relating to capital punishment which were specifically annotated to books of the
Old Testament. See THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MAssAcHuSETrs 5-6 (M. FARRAND ed. 1929).
25

26 G.

L.

HASKINS,

PARLIAMENTARY

ASPECTS

OF

REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT

IN

EARLY

[hereinafter cited as PARLIAMENTARY ASPECTS]. Cf. W.
NOTESTEIN, THE ENGLISH PEOPLE ON THE EVE OF COLONIZATION 185-201 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as NOTESTEIN].
27
See generally K. A. LOCKmiDGE, A NEw ENGLAND TOWN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1970)
[hereinafter cited as A NEw ENGLAND TOWN].
28 LAw AND AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 113-40.
29 Id.
MASSACHUSETrS 203, 218 (1970)
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Testament.3"

from the Mosaic code of the Old
The adoption of various forms
of English law with which the colonists were familiar was no slavish
reproduction but was selective and creative. The process was one of
syncretizing traditional English ideas with attitudes and convictions implicit
in the Puritan way of life, on the basis of reason as well as experience, and
of the urgency of fulfilling the dictates of God's commission to found a new
commonwealth in the wilderness. The process, which included also rejection
and adaptation, was peculiar to the legal systems of New England, especially
of Massachusetts, and reflected not only tradition but design traced from the
social, political and spiritual life which had formed within the community.
Some review and evaluation of the evidence supporting the conclusions
just stated will follow shortly, but for the moment they provide a basis for a
brief summary of the role of biblical authoritarianism, on the one hand, and
representative institutions, on the other, in the evolution of the web of the
colony's government from 1630 to 1650. Pervasive as was the Puritan emphasis
on realizing the divine mission which the early colony leaders and their
supporters were zealously bent upon accomplishing, the growing insistence on
the part of the inhabitants for a larger voice in the colony's affairs became a
factor of even greater significance. Central to this latter development were
their continuing efforts to place curbs on the powers of the colony's officers
and Assistants, first, in matters of general governmental policies; later, as time
went on, in the administration of justice in the courts.31 Hand in hand with
those efforts came the movement to reduce the laws to writing, which
culminated first in the constitutional provisions which made up the Body of
Liberties of 1641 and, seven years later, in the thorough revision and
codification of the laws in the 1648 Code.3" These developments, which
resulted in curbing the original broad powers of the elected magistrates, make
clear that the locus of power in the government was not by any means confined
to a supposed oligarchy of magistrates, much less to the clergy. To a
substantial extent power was shared by the broadly representative body of
freemen sitting in the General Court of the colony.
Dilettante legal speculation has often insisted upon the generalization that
in England, from the time of the Plantagenet kings, the crown was the sole
fountain of justice. Careful historians of the law, however, have long realized
that the processes by which this useful fiction became fact were slow, halting,
and at times retrogressive. Even in the seventeenth century, a multitude of
special and local courts still challenged the common law and retained ancient
jurisdiction over various types of legal controversies. The ecclesiastical courts,
so See

THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSEITS 5-6 (M. FARRAND ed. 1929).

31 LAw AND AuTIORrrY, supra note 2, at 188.

832d. at 113-40. See also THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss2/1
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for example, still exercised wide powers over matrimonial and testamentary
causes. 3 In addition, the local courts of the manors and boroughs still
possessed extraordinary vitality and were vigorous and active in cases
involving petty crimes, trespasses and debts, sued upon by local people for
whom those courts still remained the legal center of gravity. Those customary
courts and the law they applied, in addition to the sessions presided over
locally by justices of the peace, were far more familiar to most of the colonists
emigrating to New England than were the central royal courts, at Westminster
or on circuit, which administered the writ system of the common law.
Scholarly research has demonstrated both from the court records and from the
1648 Code of laws how widely and effectively the early Massachusetts colonists
drew upon the procedures as well as the substantive law of English manorial
and other local courts; for example, in the law of descent, in provisions for the
recording of deeds and mortgages, and in procedural and other remedies for
violations of the elastic concept of nuisance."1 Punishments similar to those
imposed by justices of the peace, acting pursuant to the statutes, and to those
meted out by the courts of English archdeacons, are also common in the
Massachusetts court records. 5
Likewise, the magistrates of the colony undertook to deal in the civil
courts with other matters substantially reserved in England to the jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical courts, i.e., with probate, intestate distribution, marriage
and even divorce; 6 indeed, the records reveal familiarity with the technicalities
of appointments of personal representatives de bonis non and cum
testamento annexo11 On the other hand, laws protecting a surviving spouse
are clearly imitative, in nearly every detail, of English common law dower,"9
while at least two of the colony's criminal enactments are obviously copied
from Elizabethan statutes. 9 Along with such practices reflecting types of
English law with which the colonists had been familiar in their homeland, there
were nevertheless, specific enactments of biblical provisions from Deuteron38 See generally 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621 (1931).
34 Id. See also LAW AND AuTHoRrry, supra note 2, at 167; Haskins, The Beginnings of the
Recording System in Massachusetts, 21 BOSTON L. REv. 281 (1941); Haskins, The Beginnings
of PartibleInheritance In the American Colonies, 51 YALE L. REV. 1280 (1942).
35 LAw AND AutmoRrrY,supra note 2, at 183-84; cf. W. H. HALE, PRECEDENTS AND PROCEEDINGS
IN CIuMINAL CAUSES 1475-1640 (1847).
se See LAW AND AuTHORrrY, supra note 2, at 194-95; Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible
Inheritance in the American Colonies, 51 YALE L.J. 1280 (1942).
'7 1 ESSEX PROBATE RECORDS 8, 24, 58 (1916); 2 EssEx PROBATE RECORDS 81, 90, 122, 190
(1916).
38

See generally Haskins, A Problem in the Reception of Common Law Dower, 97 U. PA. L.

REv. 842 (1949); Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARv. L. REv. 42
(1948).
3 See RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 12, at 18, 180; 43 ELIZ. I, c. 7 (1601); 1 JAC. I,

c. 22 (1603).
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omy, Exodus and Leviticus in the capital provisions of the criminal code."'
Although, in the beginning, the adoption of familiar English law, and to
a small extent of biblical precepts, did not take place on a systematic basis, the
process of codification-which extended over several years-presented an
opportunity to select carefully what seemed suitable and expedient, and to
eschew the cumbersome machinery and remedies of the common law insofar
as the codifiers were familiar with it.," Thus, although the laws of the colony
seem to have been based largely upon the secular laws of England, the
colonists, who were active in revising the laws and framing the Code, chose to
reconstruct out of their varied heritage a legal system which not only accorded
with their ideas of fair dealing, good faith and common sense, but which also
comported with their sense of urgency to fulfill the mission of the colony.
The processes by which the body of laws were assembled and the
instruments of government perfected in the course of the first 18 years of
the colony's existence have been related elsewhere."2 That the affairs of the
colony were principally managed and overseen by a small, closely knit group
of about a dozen of its elected officers and magistrates has been widely and
properly acknowledged." Acceptance of that generalization, however, has
frequently led to the misconceptions that the representatives of the towns,
who were also members of the General Court, did not possess substantial
powers, and that most of the remaining inhabitants, since they were not
church members, had no voice whatsoever in the government."
It is, of course, true that freemanship, and hence the franchise was
ostensibly based on church membership and acceptance of orthodox Puritan
principles, endorsed by the civil leaders and propounded and explained by the
clergy from the pulpit." In the very early 1630's, probably no more than five
per cent of the colony's total population had been admitted to the churches
and could vote, and that fact, taken with the assumption just referred to, has
further helped to perpetuate the fiction of a theocracy, or at least of a "Bible"
commonwealth, as the central characteristic of the government. "6 Even so
thoughtful a scholar as Dr. R. W. Pole can be misleading when he writes that
40 See THE LAws AND LBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETrS

(M.

FARRAND ed. 1929).

41 See G. L. HASKINS, The First American Reform of Civil Procedure, in PERSPECTIVES IN
LAW: ESSAYS FOR AUSTN WAKEMAN Sco-r 113 (1964).
42 LAW AND AUTHO~rY, supra note 2, at 113-40.

43 See, e.g., LAW AND AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 9-24; H. L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN
COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1904).

44See J. T. ADAMs, THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND 118-45 (1921), which amplified the
preliminary conclusions found in 3 J. G. PALFREY, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 41 (1865).
46 RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 12, at 87.
46 See generally H. E. WARE, COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS PROCEEDINGS (1907).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss2/1
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the colony was a theocratic state with representation confined to "the faithful."""
It remains, therefore, to say something further with respect to the franchise.
Wide differences of opinion exist and have been expressed as to the
extent of the franchise, purportedly restricted by the 1631 enactment to adult
males who could qualify for church membership. ' A law of 1635, not
apparently modified until 1647, was even more specific as to local elections:
"none but freemen shall have any vote in any towne, in any action of
aucthoritie."'9 If one relies on the lists of freemen printed in the colony's
records and compares it with the probable colony population 10 years after
settlement, it would appear that even by 1640 probably no more than seven or
eight per cent of the inhabitants had any active or potential voice in the
government.5 0 Studies of the town records, however, lead to vastly different
conclusions. Although such studies have generally been concerned with
office-holding and voting by freemen in the towns, they necessarily shed
considerable light on the eligibility of townsmen to vote in the yearly elections
of deputies for the General Court. The town records not only suggest but seem
to prove either that the 1631 law was not meant to be as restrictive as its
words indicate, or that the lists of freemen are incomplete, or that in practice
the restriction was substantially ignored. 1
We know, of course, that freemanship was not restricted to any
economic or social class, but was based upon individual spiritual worth
as measured strictly by the church congregations. 2 Indeed, Nathaniel Ward,
presumed author of the 1641 Body of Liberties, expressed his concern to
Governor Winthrop as early as 1639 about the great power and low social
status of the freemen. 3 We also know that many church members could and
did avoid freemanship, out of choice, because of the responsibilities it
entailed.' Nevertheless, a survey of householders in the town of Roxbury in
1639-40, made by Admiral Morison, seems to prove that 84 per cent of the
male residents were church members and voters." Time does not here permit
4T R. W. POLE, PoLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 34 (1966) [hereinafter cited as POLE].
48RECORDS OF MASSACHUSET S, supra note 12, the law of 1631. See the studies of Brown,

Freemanshipin Puritan Massachusetts, 59 AM. His'r. REV. 865 (1954); Simmons, Freemanship
in Early Massachusetts, Some Suggestions and a Case Study, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 422 (1962).
49 RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 12, at 161.
50
LAw AN AUTHORTY, supra note 2, at 29.
51 A NEW ENGLAND TowN, supra note 27, at 56; Wall, The Massachusetts Bay Colony Franchise
In 1647,27 WM. &MARY Q. 136 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wall].
52 LAw AND AuTHORrry, supra note 2, at 86-87.
53 See the letter from N. Ward to John Winthrop of 1639 which is preserved in 4 WINTHROP
PAPERS 162 (Mass. Historical Society 1944); POLE, supra note 47.
5' RECORDS OF MASSACHUSETrS, supra note 12, at 38.
55
OF THE BAY COLONY 341 (1930).
See S.byE.
MoRIsON, BUILDERS 1976
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examination of surveys made for other towns, but they, too, appear to indicate
that on the average at least 60 per cent of the male inhabitants in the colony
were voters." Thus, although no precise conclusions can yet be formed as to
the actual number of persons in the colony who were eligible to, and did in
fact, vote, it seems clear that the franchise was far broader than most scholars
have been willing to concede, and that Massachusetts "was not as aristocratic,
as undemocratic, as we have been led to believe" by such historians as
J. G. Palfrey, J. T. Adams and C. M. Andrews." It also seems clear that
we still have much to learn about early Massachusetts government from
careful study of the town records, particularly as to the significance attaching
to what may be varied uses of the word "freeman."
It is appropriate, now, to return to other aspects of the question of why
Massachusetts did not become a "Bible" commonwealth. Obviously, between
the religious and allied beliefs of the Islamic world, on the one hand, and those
of Englishmen in the colony of Massachusetts, on the other, there are very
wide differences and divergencies. This is not the forum, nor have I the
knowledge or the expertise, to compare them. Nevertheless, comparisons
between Islamic and early Massachusetts law are not wholly inapposite; for
Islamic law, though derived from sacred sources, also evolved from customary
law and administrative practise by a succession of jurists through a process of
adoption, adaptation and rejection.5" Yet, from what has already been said
of the evolution of early Massachusetts law, it seems clear that, devout as the
early settlers were, and as intently as their minds and hearts were dedicated at
the outset to the establishment of a new Israel through the institutions of
government and activity of the churches, they remained, in their respective
circumstances and backgrounds, Englishmen of their time. They brought with
them outlooks and social attitudes which not only reflected contemporary
England but much of the legacy and humanism of the Renaissance.59 Thus,
except insofar as their daily life and intellectual tastes were affected by Puritan
principles, and their institutions necessarily molded by the same driving
concerns for which the colonial enterprise had been undertaken, they remained
basically English in their outlooks, habits and understanding. Certain vital
and inherited traditional beliefs and sentiments were never eradicated by the
Puritan zeal to reform almost every aspect of human activity.
Reference has been made to the adoption and adaptation in the colony
of familiar English law and also of representative government. Attention
56 See, e.g., A NEW ENGLAND TowN, supra note 27, at 56; Wall, supra note 51, at 136.
37 Brown, Freemanship in PuritanMassachusetts, 59 AM. HIST. REv. 865, 883 (1954).
58 Cf. Anderson, The Future of Islamic Law, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 616 (1962).
generally J. SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MOHAMMEDAN JURISPRUDENCE (1950).
59
LAw An AUTuoRrTY, supra note 2, at 111.
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should also be directed to the colonists' ingrained ideals with respect to the
separation of church and state, which stretched back to at least the first
Plantagenets and which had recently been illuminated vividly by events under
the Tudors and the first Stuarts, as well as by the continuing separate existence
of secular and ecclesiastical courts. Important also were convictions about the
so-called basic rights of Englishmen, which were believed to be enshrined in
Magna Carta and its recurrent publications, as well as in the revered traditions
of the common law. Not forgotten were recent challenges to that law by the
king's prerogative courts, in particular the notorious High Commission, from
whose determined efforts to suppress schisms and enforce uniformity so
many Puritans had suffered. Exemplifying this concern for individual and
private rights, for due process, and for resistance to authoritarianism were
various episodes already alluded to in the colony's early history, including
the 1632 Watertown protest against taxation without consent, the 1634
insistence on representation in the General Court, the antinomianism
controversy, and the outcry against discretionary justice which helped to
pave the way for the codification movement.6 0
One of the most effective brakes upon the efforts of the early leaders of
the colony to hold for themselves the reigns of government was the long and
deeply rooted English tradition of self-government at the king's command.
From the middle ages onwards, Englishmen had been educated-in fact,
forced-to govern themselves at local levels, first, under the direct supervision
and review of royal authority, later also as a result of long-observed custom in
town councils and parish meetings.6 " The work of these local bodies and units
in carrying out orders of the crown, directly by mandate or through orders of
justices of the peace and others-a system so painstakingly delineated by the
Webbs for a slightly later period--is paralleled closely by the functions
undertaken by, or imposed upon, the towns of early Massachusetts, whose
genesis as units of political obligation seem to have derived from the English
parish. 6 There, the town quickly became the basic unit of government in
which or near which most of the inhabitants lived, so that, unlike England,
where the gentry had become the significant political element," the township
system became the core of the social and governmental organization of the
colony and was broadly representative of the population as a whole. While
Id. at 113-40.
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accepting centralized authority in which they became progressively involved,
the colonists nevertheless continued, at least as effectively as in England, to
govern themselves at the local level; and they did so through town officials
whose names and functions were patterned upon English counterparts. 8 Their
insistence on local autonomy in areas too numerous to detail were progressively
endorsed and supported by the colony's government, which-in the absence
of anything akin to the French bureaucratic system of intendants-was far
beyond the latter's competence to supervise closely."7
Another vital force which began to infiltrate the colonial government at
an early date was that of English parliamentary traditions. Long vital to the
political life of England, representative government had received, as we know,
new impetus in Elizabethan and Stuart England, where vast social changes,
and eventually clashes with the crown, had helped to unleash forces which led
to the "winning of the initiative" by the house of commons.8 " As already
noted, representation in the colony's government was demanded at an early
date, and the town deputies became a progressively important feature of the
government as the first decade advanced. Struggling directly, as well as
through their deputies, the freemen began to combat certain aspects of what
they viewed as excessive authoritarian power in the hands of their leaders, so
that their own power in the General Court became one avenue to their own
"winning of the initiative."8 " Indeed, Governor Winthrop, on one occasion,
quieted angry voices by conceding that the colony's government was "more in
the nature of a parliament" than that of a trading company."' Moreover, many
of the colonists were men of education and substance, familiar with parliamentary tradition both as an instrument of government and as a curb on asserted
rights of the crown. Many, too, had also undoubtedly possessed the necessary
property qualification for participating in shire or borough elections. As the
1630's progressed, the influence of English parliamentary theory and practice
became steadily more evident, both in the election of town deputies and in
their work in the General Court. 1 The famous case of Sherman v. Keayne, the
"case of the missing sow," which led ultimately to making the
colonial
legislature bicameral in 1644, also suggests the inspiration of parliament."'
Town authorizations and instructions to their deputies provide further instances
of the influence of more ancient, though displaced, ideas of individual consent,
60 See LAw
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when parliamentary representatives were given plena potestas as attorneys for
their communities." Again, the work of committees, which were extensively
used by the General Court, paralleled--even if they were probably not
adaptations thereof-similar units in the house of commons, providing
cohesiveness and strengthening the growing power of the representatives in
the machinery of government. 4 Among the most important of the colony's
committees were those successively appointed to study and revise the laws, and
5
whose work culminated in the preparation of the 1648 Code." For over a
decade, the freemen had been insisting that written, published laws would not
only put a curb upon the threat of arbitrary government but, by enacting them
in comprehensive form as a code which incorporated selected traditional
English law, would prevent for the future, as did representative government
itself, the establishment of a commonwealth where secular law could be
based primarily on biblical text and precept.
It should also be noticed that in Massachusetts, as in England at a
somewhat earlier period, the elected deputies were rapidly transformed from
a body of local men, locally minded, who presented local grievances to the
central government, into an aspiring partner in the general government of
the colony. Many features, other than mere forms, which characterized the
English house of commons at the end of Elizabeth's reign, as described by
Sir John Neale "-ability,maturity and assertiveness, which nurtured political
skill and leadership on a national scale-seem to have been transplanted to
help make the Massachusetts house of deputies representative of broad
colonial interests. At the same time, older parliamentary conceptions of
attorneyship and of individual consent persisted and appeared sporadically in
the instructions which they were given by their electors." It is curious, as
Dr. Pole has remarked, that Puritan ideas of contract seem to have afforded
the opportunity for resuscitating and translating into practice in the colony, the
"old, shadowy English notion of individual consent" to enacted law, despite
the fact that in England the theory of consent, enunciated by Sir Thomas
Smith, had already passed into the oblivion of fiction."8
One vital feature of outstanding importance in the system of representative
government in Massachusetts, in contrast with that of England, should be
emphasized, and that is the backgrounds of the elected deputies. Because of
3 PARLIAMENTARY ASPECTS,
74
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lack of thorough genealogical studies, almost as little is known of the
background of the Massachusetts deputies as of the members of parliament
at this time."9 Yet, one distinction stands out very clearly. While in England, as
Professor Notestein has pointed out, members of the House of Commons
tended-both in shire and borough elections-to be drawn from the gentry,
men "from prominent families who were in touch with London, and who were
likely to be more than usually intelligent,""0 this was not true of early
Massachusetts. A few of the deputies were well educated, and of those few,
many were university graduates; 8 several were prominent and well-to-do. The
majority, however, were drawn from what may be described as the colonial
middle-class - merchants, innkeepers, tanners, carpenters, shipbuilders,
clothiers and tailors; more humble trades were also represented by blacksmiths,
shoemakers, millers and weavers.82 Their trades and occupations, however, are
probably less significant than their individual experience in town government,
where many had proven their abilities; indeed, several served concurrently as
deputies and as town selectmen.8" In any event, the representative element in
Massachusetts government was characterized by diversity and had a far
broader base than did parliament. Because the colony was a small, closely knit
community, with the towns not far distant from one another, this broad base
made for greater cohesiveness among the deputies and for larger representation
of general social and economic interest. So, too, did the fact that most deputies
served for successive terms, with the result that even in the 1640's there were
veteran legislators among them with extensive committee experience.
Taken in conjunction with earlier expressed conclusions as to the extent
of the franchise, these circumstances suggest that the sense of oligarchy within
the colony's government had distinctly faded as the second decade of its
existence drew to a close. It is true that many of the colonists remained outside
the church, largely by choice, but the interests of such persons-many in the
merchant class-were nevertheless recognized, either formally through
the interchange of views in town meetings or informally through propinquity
of residence. Most townsmen, though non-freemen, had extensive, wide secular
interests in common with the "faithful"-for example, land allotments,
property disputes, licensing, defense, to mention the more obvious; indeed,
non-freemen not only took part in town affairs but even voted for and held
town offices before the enabling act of 1647.4 Nevertheless, although the
7
9PARLIAmENTARY ASPECTS,supra note 26, at 220.
so NorESTmN, supra note 26, at 185.
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power of official action was substantially confined by law to freemen, every
inhabitant, freeman or non-freeman, was accorded the right to attend any
session of any court or town meeting and "either by speech or writing, to
move any lawfull, seasonable, or material question; or to prevent any
necessarie motion, complaint, petition, bill or information... ."I' Thus, one
of the basic constitutional guarantees of modem democratic governments
was assured to every resident of the colony.
One factor in the development of Massachusetts institutions which is
frequently overlooked is the economic depression which befell the colony
at the beginning of the 1640's. The onset of the civil war in England, with its
attendant shifts in Puritan opinion and strategy, brought emigration to a virtual
standstill. Every effort was immediately required to stimulate trade and local
industry, as well as to regulate prices and wages, to save the colony's economy
from disaster. Those efforts succeeded to a degree which could scarcely have
been foreseen, so that even within a decade, the entire basis of the
Massachustts economy was radically altered. 6 Wealth succeeded subsistenceliving, and with that change necessarily were born new ideals which shook and
eventually undermined the old religious foundations of the colony's government. New horizons, new wealth and undreamed of commercial rewards began
to, and ultimately did, as the century progressed, change the primary focus of
men's attention from the soil and the pulpit, as the descent into the marketplace
revealed the glitter of wealth to be reaped from coastal and ocean commerce.
CONCLUSION

Hopefully, the foregoing exposition, while explaining certain aspects of
the relationship between the central government of the Bay Colony and its
representative element, has provided some evidence as to why the colony never
became, in literal terms, a "Bible" commonwealth. Further evidence could be
adduced to support this conclusion, as could wider and painstaking search in
the records of the Massachusetts towns and detailed inquiries into the English
background and experience of their representatives before emigration.
Nevertheless, the available evidence seems to justify the statement that
although the Bible and its interpretations provided an indispensable touchstone
for Massachusetts colonial law and institutions, it was not, and never became,
the cornerstone of Puritan legal and institutional thought. Herein, perhaps, lies
a basic distinction between legal development in Islamic countries and
in colonial Massachusetts. For centuries Islamic law has been regarded as
derived principally from divine revelation, and, since there is no power to
change the Koran, one of its current problems now is how such an authoritarian
85
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law can be adapted by interpretation to resolve the typical conflicts of modern
Mohammedan society. 7 The Massachusetts colonists, on the other hand,
though guided and inspired in the formation of their society by biblical rules
which they likewise had no power to change were nevertheless able, on the
basis of deep-rooted secular traditions, to make needed adaptations quickly
and easily, by relegating divine law to a position subordinate to those
accustomed ways. Despite their deep reverence for the Scriptures, and a
will, at first, to be guided by them, the colonists almost never enacted literal
biblical precepts into law, even in limited areas, before they had been carefully
and eclectically scrutinized and had passed logical justification. Central as
the Bible was in Puritan life and thought, it was only one influence among
many in a rich cultural heritage which was quickened by the challenge of
secular as well as religious problems in a new land.
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